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STATEEENT OF THE CASE
This is a brief in opposition to an appeal from an

0 ~er revoking Appellant's driver's license.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On May 17, 1977, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr.,
reviewed the order of the Department of Public Safety revoking
Appellant's driver's license and upheld the order.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the lower court's determination
affirmed.
STATEt1ENT OF THE FACTS
On January 26, 1977, Appellant was arrested and charged
with driving under the influence of alcohol.

On being brought

to tte police station, Appellant was asked to submit to a breathalyzer test after being informed of the implied consent law.
Appellant refused to take the breathalyzer
Respondent,

test~

Georgia R. Shaw, reviewed these facts, took

testimony, and revoked Appellant's license effective March 19,
1977.

The District Court Judge then found that the petitioner

unreasonably refused to submit to a chemical test to determine
the alcoholic content of his blood pursuant to the laws of the
State of Utah (R, 11).
ARGUEHENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURTS FINDING THAT PETITIONER'S
REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO A CHEHICAL TEST tvAS UNREASONABLE SHOULD BE SUSTAINED BY THIS COURT.
This court in Gassman v. Darius, 543 P.2d 197 (1975)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library principle
Services and Technology
administered by the Utah
State Library.
stated a well-known
ofAct,appellate
law,
"We do not reMachine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

verse the trial judge unless he clearly eoes violence to
as they relate to his findings."

r,

the

ThE· facts of this case

and ~'
applicable law clearly support the Distirct Court's d t
e errcinat
that Appellant's refusal was unreasonable.
Respondent disagrees w~ th the statement in Appellant•,
brief that "The alternate test

(blood) was readily available."

(No transcipt was designated by the Appellant).

The facts were

that the breathalyzer test was readily available while the bloc:.
alcohol test was not.

The officer made that clear to the A~

pellant, explained it, read him the statute and then designated
the test to be tc:.ken.

The trial court obviously be·lieved these

facts.
The Appellant, would put the shoe on the wrong foot
and have the c.fficer tried for unreasonableness.
actions are not on re-trial.

The officer's

The only reason given and argued;

the Appellant for refusing the breathalyzer test is that he be1 ieved i t to be unreliable.

Under these facts, if tr.e officer

were on trial, he would have acted reasonably in requesting
breathalyzer test anyway.

t~

So found the trial court and we ask

this court to uphold that finding.
POINT II
APPELLANT DID IN FACT UNREASONABLY REFUSE TO
SUBMIT TO A CHEMICAL TEST PURSUANT TO UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED 41-6-44.10.
Appellant's brief attempts to use Elliot v. Doriur.,
557 P.2d 759

(1976), to argue the position that if the order
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revol:ing Appellant's license is not overturned, this Court
would be granting police officers absolute power to determine which
test is to be used.

Elliot seems to support this necessary

result and in no way supports the Appellant's case.

In fact, the

holding of Elliot could dictate the necessary outcome of the case
at tar, ie., that since tr.e alternate test was r,ot readily available, Appellant's refusal to take the available breathalyzer test
v1as unreasonable, whether available or not.

By statute, the

test requested is presumed to be a reliable and reasonable one.
Appellant contends his refusal was not unreasonable
due to his fear of the unreliability of the breathalyzer test
and that he should be given the choice.

This court in Elliot

stated:
In construing the meaning of reasonable
cause, in this subsection, ((c) of Utah
Code Annotated 44-6-44.10), it is significant the person is granted the right: to
submit to a 'chemical test,' the choice of
which is by statute, determined by the arresting officer. A stated preference for
another chemical test is not a reasonable
cause for refusal of a requested test .
... A person may not unilaterally determine
one of the tests designated in subsection
(a) of 41-6-44.10 to be unreliable; then
on that alone, claim his refusal to submit
to such test was with reasonable cause .
... Plaintiff claims the subsection by the
police officer, denied him a reliable test.
Such is without merit. A chemical test
specified by statute may not be deemed unreliable as a matter of law. The statute
specifically deslgnates the arresting officer
as the one to determine the test to be administered.
(Emphasis added).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The foregoing quotes demonstrate this court's interpretation of the Utah ImpJied Consent Statute.

All tests

.
1

dicated in the statute, including the breathalyzer tEst, are

dee~ed by law to be realiable and reasonable.
cides which test is to be taken.

The

officer~

lvhen one is asked to submit

to a particular test, he must, on his refusal to submit is
reviewed to determine if the refusal was reasonable.

ther,

This

court, as quoted above, said that a stated preference for a~~
chemical test and a fear that a particular test is unreliable a
not solely reasonable causes for a refusal tc. take a particular
test.
rr.erit.

This Appellant's only contention is, therefore,

without

The sole fact that the blood test requested, but was

not readily available and would have caused undue delay and ris
of losing the evidence, is an unreasonc-.ble ground for refusal.
If he had some other valid reasons for refusal, the appellant
might have been reasonable, but such is not the trial court's
finding on the facts of this case.
The above construction of Utah Code Annotated

41-~~.

was incorporated into the code via amendment by the 1977 Utah
Legislature.

The 1977 amendments tc. this section provide

in nc

uncertain t.erms that the officer has discretion as to which tes·
used and the tests are presumed to be reliable.
tests have been used for years) .

(Breathalyzer

Subsection A of the latest

statute grants the right to a contemporaneous test if desired.
POINT III
POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS
DICTATE
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding for digitization provided
by the InstituteTHAT
of MuseumSTATE
and Library Services
Library Services
and TechnologySAFETY
Act, administered
by the Utah
State Library.
HOTOR
VEHICLE
LAWS
DEAL
S~VIFTLY
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AND EFFICIENTLY WITH UNSAFE DRIVERS.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Dixon v. Love, on May 16, 1977,
upheld an Illinois law authorizing revocation or suspension of
a drivers license without preliminary hE,arings.

The court ruled

that holding prehearings in every case would impede administrative efficiency and prove a danger to the public on the highways.
This is just one example of how state courts are tightening their
drunk driving laws. The 1977 amendments to its Implied Consent
LaW show a definite concern for public safety.

The policy behind

these amendments is obviously due to tmdue delay tactics.

Keeping

the highways safe for the innocent driver seems certainly present
in i.:his court's construction of the implied consent
even before the

stat~:,tory

stat~:•tes

amendments \'ient into effect.

Utah's

judicial decisions and legislative enactments have also reflected
concern with the drunk driving problem.

The District Court's

finding certainly is in accord with policy and holdings by this
court.
CONCLUSION
This court's statutory interpretation of the applicable
law gives the peace officer discretion as to which available
chemical test is to be used.

The facts and applicable law

clearly show that Appellant's refusal to take the breathalyzer
test was unreasonable.

A refusal to take the test offered due

to fear of its unreliability and/or a stated preference for another
test is clearly an unreasonable refusal.
Respondent requests this court to uphold tt.e Trial
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